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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
CONTRACTS----IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE-GoLD PAYMENT COAUSES.-
As a result of the issuance of paper money during the Civil War and the fear
of greenback or free silver legislation, it has long been customary to insert in
all bond issues a provision that they are payable in gold coin of the United
States. A recent decision of the New York Supreme Court enunciates a
principle which would make all these clauses meaningless. The bonds of the
Libby's Hotel Corporation were payable "in gold coin of the United States of
America of not less than the present standard weight and fineness as now
fixed by law (notwithstanding any law which may now or hereafter make
anything else legal tender for the payment of debts)." The property in-
volved had been condemned by the City of New York, and the trustee under
the bonds requested instructions whether it could accept payment in legal
tender paper money in satisfaction of the mortgages. The case arose when
there was an embargo on the export of gold, and when a presidential procla-
mation had withdrawn all gold and gold certificates from circulation, impos-
ing heavy penalties on those who possessed more than $100 in gold and did
not exchange it for paper money. Held, the bonds may be paid in any legal
tender money. Irving Trust Co. v. Hazlewood (N. Y. .1933) 136 Commercial
and Financial Chronicle (May 27, 1933) 3636.
Under the Civil War Legal Tender Acts the same question arose. The
great majority of the state courts held that the United States, acting under
the war power and the power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof",
might validly provide that any legal tender money might be used to pay bonds
or other obligations which were stipulated to be paid only in gold. Appel v.
Woltman (1860) 38 Mo. 194; Whetstone v. Colley (1865) 36 fll. 328; Thayer
v. Hedges (1866) 26 Ind. 116; Wood v. Bullens (Mass. 1863) 6 Allen 516;
Rodes v. Bronson (1866) 34 N. Y. 646; Mer'vine v. Sailor (1866) 52 Pa. 9;
note (1896) 29 L. R. A. 512; note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 1499. Most of the state
cases which denied the existence of the power in Congress did so on the basis
that the particular contract which they were construing provided for the
payment in gold coin (or gold) as a commodity rather than for payment in
money. Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills (Mass. 1867) 14 Allen 389 (contract pro-
vided for the payment of a specific number of ounces of gold or silver as
rent); Dutton v. Pailaret (1866) 52 Pa. 109 (gold coin of a specified
weight and fineness specifically excluding legal tender). This dispute
was settled by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Bronson v. Rodes (1869) 7 Wall. 229 that the Legal Tender Acts were
not meant to apply to such contracts. It must be admitted that the tone
of the opinion is such that it would seem that the majority thought that
Congress did not have the power to pass a statute which should apply
to contracts providing for payment in gold which were made before the
statute was passed. One justice concurred specially because he was in dis-
agreement with this attempt to limit the power of Congress. Justice Miller
filed a strong dissenting opinion. The majority went on the theory that such
a gold clause made the contract really one for the delivery of a commodity
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rather than for the payment of money. The court did not realize that any
such construction must result in rendering the instruments non-negotiable
for they do not then possess the essential attribute of being payable in money.
In reading this opinion it must be remembered that it was rendered by the
same court which was soon to hold the Legal Tender Act unconstitutional as
applied to prior existing contracts. Hepburn v. Griswold (1870) 8 Wallace
603. This decision was overruled in the Legal Tender Cases (1871) 12 Wall.
457. Since Juilliard v. Greenman (1884) 11 U. S. 421, the power of the
United States even in times of peace to issue legal tender paper money cannot
be doubted.
In the instant case the New York court distinguishes Bronson v. Rodes by
pointing out that it applied to a situation in which two types of money were
legally in circulation, while this is now no longer true. The Court chiefly re-
lied on the very recent English case of In Re Societies Intercommunale Belge
d'Electricite-Fiest v. The Company (Ch. Div. 1932) 174 Law Times 367,
aff'd (Ct. of App. 1933) 148 Times Law Reports 344. This is unfortunate.
In the first place the gold clause in that case was so badly drawn that the
courts could and did construe it not to require payment in gold as a mere mat-
ter of construction of the language used. Secondly, the English Parliament
is not hampered by any constitutional restrictions on its powers.
Under the law as it existed at the time the principal case was decided, it
would seem that the New York Court could have obtained very nearly the
same result by treating this as a case where performance of the terms of a con-
tract was made impossible by subsequent legislation, giving the obligee a mere
right to damages. Restatement of the Law of Contracts sec. 458. This right
to damages would be valueless, since there was no legal use to which the gold
might be put by which it would command more than the stipulated parity in
paper money.
Congress has recently regularized this situation by passing a joint resolu-
tion specifically providing that paper money may be tendered in payment of
all public and private debts whether or not they are so worded as to require
payment in gold alone. However much one may quarrel with the economic
wisdom or ethical morality of such a policy of national repudiation of con-
tract rights, its legality would seem clear. The clause forbidding the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts only restricts state action. The due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot restrict Congress in the rea-
sonable exercise of its powers granted by the Constitution. G. W. S., '33.
INTERNAL REvENUE-INcomE TAX-LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS.-The settlor
took out several policies of life insurance in favor of trustees. These trus-
tees were to hold the proceeds of the policies for named beneficiaries. At the
same time the settlor transferred certain securities to the trustees which they
were to use as far as necessary to pay the premiums on the insurance policies
and to distribute, in their discretion, any surplus to the beneficiaries of the
policies. The trusts were irrevocable and no part of the proceeds of the
policies could become part of the estate of the settlor. The settlor had waived
all his rights to change the beneficiary of the policy. Subsequent to the
creation of these trusts Congress enacted a statute which purported to re-
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